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Abstract 
 
The UK government’s evaluation agenda for youth work has been subject of significant 
debate. Its opponents have highlighted the ends-oriented model of evaluation - Theory 
of Change - proposed by the UK government with youth work’s open-ended, fluid 
approach (Ord, 2014; In Defence of Youth Work, 2012). However, this model of 
evaluation has gained a great deal of traction among local authorities and youth work 
organisations (including the National Youth Agency). This is potentially due to the 
government’s claim that their aim is simply ‘good science’ using the language of 
‘scientific rigour’ and ‘better assessment’. This article argues that the approaches being 
marketed – and adopted – are an example of regulatory ‘scientism’ wherein allusions to 
‘good’ science are used to govern youth work. However evaluation of youth work should 
not be rejected entirely as it can also provide opportunities for innovation and change.  
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Introduction 
 
Youth work and the daily practices of youth work are subject to increasing regulation. As 
numerous critics have noted, the practice is currently being subsumed within an 
overarching discourse of managerialism oriented towards achieving pre-set impacts and 
outcomes (Ord, 2014; Davies, 2013; Issitt and Spence, 2005). Connected to this, 
according to youth work commentators (Ord, 2014; Cooper, 2012), is the production of 
evidence through particular forms of evaluation research. Following the Department of 
Education and Skills (DfES) White Paper Transforming Youth Work - Resourcing 
Excellent Youth Services (DfES, 2002) and the House of Commons Education 
Committee’s (HCEC) review of youth work (2011), youth work organisations are now 
compelled to conduct ‘scientifically rigorous’ evaluations (ibid) which can clearly 
demonstrate the impact of their engagement with young people. Subsequent guidance 
has identified ‘Theory of Change’ evaluation as the preferred approach (Young 
Foundation, 2011).  
 
This article is located within the debate about youth work evaluation in the UK as one 
strand of the broader discourse of neoliberal governmentality which the practice 
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operates within. However, while it is important to note, as others have (Issitt and 
Spence, 2005), that the current UK youth work evaluation agenda is a vehicle for 
governing youth work through research - a ‘scientism’ (Torrance, 2008: 522) or facade 
of systematic, scientifically rigorous analysis masking a decidedly non-scientific 
neoliberal political strategy - it equally important not to reject the basic premise of this 
agenda, namely, that youth work should be subject to evaluation. While even the HCEC 
does not question the benefits participation in youth work brings to young people and 
communities, it would be wrong to assume that youth work is inherently more positive 
than other forms of engagement or that youth work is above critique. Youth work exists 
within and is the product of the same discourse as other organisations and thus 
embodies the same subjectivities and power relations. At the very least youth work’s 
position as a more positive alternative to formal education (for example) need to be 
critiqued in order to gauge the validity of this claim. Moreover, a publicly-funded sector, 
youth work needs to articulate its merit and give an account of itself to the people who 
support it.  
 
However, evaluation does not necessarily have to be restrictive in the way the current 
approach is. Arguably it is through such critical reflection that youth work can become 
aware of the power relations and disciplinary discourses within is and open up 
opportunities for innovation for new ways of thinking and being. As Foucault and 
Rabinow (1997) suggests it is through developing an awareness of ourselves that 
possibilities for ‘mutation’ or challenging discourse in its current form. Moreover, 
following Deleuze (1991) and the ‘new empiricists’, it is only through reflection that the 
abstract, imagined body can be brought into being in the present moment. In other 
words evaluation allows youth work to bring what it believes itself to be (its abstract self) 
to be known, touched, and embodied (its actual self). Further, in actualising the abstract 
(Bignall, 2007), youth work can bring itself closer to its future self (both known as an 
aspiration and unknown as a future aspiration). This self is addressed by Spinoza 
(Scruton, 1999) as the not yet or a self that exists in futurity if not in materiality. 
 
What I contend here is that the approach being imposed upon youth work - Theory of 
Change - does not facilitate this and an alternative approach is needed. I do this by 
outlining the problems with the conflation of a single method with more rigorous 
scientific research (HCEC, 2011), demonstrating why Theory of Change is a poor fit for 
youth work and arguing that it facilitates ‘governance through research’ rather than 
productive evaluation contributing to ‘social betterment’ (Mark et al, 2000: vii). 
Throughout this discussion I adopt the labels ‘scientism’ or ‘bad science’ to describe the 
current evaluation model being imposed. This is in response to the claim by policy-
makers and organisations like the Young Foundation that their structures produced 
more ‘scientifically rigorous’ evidence than the personalised accounts (labelled as 
‘anecdotal’ by the committee) submitted during the HCEC review. That said, my aim 
here is not to present a unified model of ‘good science’; as Kuhn (1953) notes the term 
‘science’ covers a broad disunified range of approaches and perspective. Rather my 
aim is to suggest – albeit tentatively – a way to improve youth work evaluation which 
does not replicate the regulatory impacts of the current scientistic approach without 
rejecting evaluation entirely. I will try to open up a discussion on how to create a 
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dialogue between evaluation and policy so that the critical possibilities of evaluation can 
be exercised while still being useful to policy-makers.  
 
Centrally the position this argument takes is twofold. First that the notion of ‘good 
science’ alluded to by the UK government under their evaluation agenda for youth work 
is principally another mechanism for reconfiguring youth work towards a more 
‘manageable’ simple system oriented towards meeting pre-set goals. This is 
demonstrated by the poor fit of the model promoted - Theory of Change. Second the 
promotion of Theory of Change is an example of methodological fundamentalism - 
where the method is more important than the subject of evaluation. The article 
highlights how such fundamentalism is problematic not only because it subverts the 
research process - wherein methods are selected based on their appropriateness - but 
also because, following thinkers such as Oakley (2000), it silences particular types of 
evidence and experiential knowledge. Furthermore, following Foucault and Deleuze, it 
limits the ability of evaluation to facilitate critical thought that could potentially lead to 
innovation in youth work practice.  
  
Theory of Change and youth work 
 
Following the demand by the HCEC review for better evaluation of youth work, a 
framework document – A framework for positive outcomes for young people (Young 
Foundation, 2012) – was published. Commissioned by the Department of Education 
and produced by the Young Foundation, with the support of a consortium of youth work-
oriented agencies, local authorities and private sector firms – this document outlines a 
model for conducting ‘scientifically rigorous’ evaluation of youth work’s merit. The 
framework focuses on social and emotional capabilities organised in a seven point 
cluster and sets out ‘a matrix of available tools for measuring these capabilities [and] 
outlines a step by step approach in practice’ (Young Foundation, 2012: 4-5). Central to 
this evaluation matrix is the identification of desired outcomes and outputs by 
programme managers at the beginning of the intervention. The rationale for this is 
threefold. According to the Young Foundation report, a priori identification of outcomes 
and outputs will: 
● Clarify what the programme is trying to achieve (content) and how (process) 
● Establish where the programme is working well and where further improvements 
are needed 
● Close the loop with feedback on progress against business needs (Young 
Foundation, 2012: 24) 
  
The framing of ‘scientifically rigorous’ evaluation as involving the pre-identification of 
outcomes and outputs is further entrenched by the Cabinet Office’s flagship programme 
for improving evaluation in youth work: the Centre for Youth Impact (CYI). Launched in 
November 2014 and proposed as a support agency for youth work professionals looking 
to develop their research skills, the CYI will ‘provide overarching support for all impact 
measurement initiatives that are relevant to the youth sector’ (Cabinet Office, 2014). 
Importantly for this article, despite claiming that the methodological frameworks they 
suggest to professionals will be ‘bespoke’, the first stage to conducting a good 
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evaluation according to Project Oracle, one of the three key organisations leading the 
CYI, involves identifying desired goals and outcomes. This is made explicit on Project 
Oracle’s own advisory website where they explain evaluation as requiring the clear 
identification of outcomes (Project Oracle website). Project Oracle argues that the 
‘validity’ of an evaluation can be assessed by comparing the evaluation against what 
they call the Standards of Evidence (Project Oracle website). An evaluation that meets 
the minimum standards of scientific rigour, they argue: 
  
has provided a coherent and plausible description of the logic that lies behind it. 
This includes a description of the project activities, intended outcomes and aim, 
how these are connected and what assumptions are being made (Project Oracle, 
2014) 
  
Here again ‘scientifically rigorous’ evaluation is constituted as research which both 
identifies desired outcomes and outputs in advance and illustrates whether these 
outcomes and outputs were successfully achieved. 
  
Methodologically this follows a Theory of Change model of evaluation research 
(something which Project Oracle make explicit on their website). First designed by Carol 
Weiss of the Aspen Institute (Weiss, 1995; Connell et al, 1995), Theory of Change 
(ToC) is a framework for conducting evaluation of social programmes which encourages 
programme stakeholders, in collaboration with evaluators, to make explicit the ‘long-
term vision of the initiative’ and ‘consider the necessary outcomes that will be required 
by the end of the programme if such an aim is to be met’ (Blamey and Mackenzie, 2007: 
443). Importantly ToC is not intended to act solely as a tool for social inquiry, ensuring 
accountability or assessing value/merit – three core features of evaluation according to 
researchers like Greene et al (2004), Alkin (2004), Feinstein (2012) and others – but as 
a means of assisting organisations to produce and put into practice evaluation research. 
ToC ostensibly makes evaluation practicable by constructing a feedback loop within the 
programme. In addition to encouraging stakeholders to make the long-term vision and 
necessary outcomes explicit, a ToC approach demands that ‘those involved in the 
programme consider the most appropriate activities or interventions required to bring 
about the desired change’ (Blamey and Mackenzie, 2007: 443). In doing so ToC 
effectively creates a roadmap for programme stakeholders to follow and refer back to as 
the programme is implemented.  
  
Advocates of ToC (Weiss, 1995; Connell and Kubisch, 1998) argue that this approach 
to evaluation can ‘sharpen the planning and implementation of an initiative’ and ‘helps 
guide choices about how and when to measure [activities’ impact]’ (Connell and 
Kubisch, 1998: 2). ToC is also framed as useful in providing ‘actionable’ evidence, i.e. 
evidence which can be ‘deemed adequate and appropriate for guiding actions in real 
world contexts’ (Julnes and Rog, 2009: 96). This is due to the fact that the process of 
designing a ToC evaluation involves constructing both a programme and an 
implementation theory (Weiss, 1995) which stakeholders can follow to achieve the pre-
stated outcomes and aims. 
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There are a number of problems with the promotion of ToC evaluation in the context of 
youth work. Some of these problems have been alluded to by youth work advocates – 
the work of In Defence of Youth Work campaign, Cooper, Issitt and Spence, and Ord 
are particularly notable here. What I want to interject into this body of writing is that the 
central problem with applying ToC to youth work is that it reconstructs a complex 
system into a simple one, thereby serving to regulate youth work to meet particular 
targets rather than evaluate the merit of youth work more generally. 
  
While what constitutes a ‘simple’ system is still the subject of much debate within 
evaluation science (Mowles, 2014), there has been a degree of consensus over what 
the core features of a simple system within the context of social policy are. These can 
be labelled as regularity, linearity and movement towards equilibrium (Callaghan, 2008). 
A simple system evolves at a steady rate along a continuous path towards a point of 
equilibrium. Coupled with this regularity, a simple system is characterised by its 
‘boundedness’. A classic example used by systems theorists is that of a drug treatment 
regime for a specific health complaint. A drug treatment regime is designed with a fixed 
end point or goal in mind. The desired results and point at which the system can be 
considered complete are planned in advance. 
  
ToC approaches, while presenting themselves as useful tools for evaluating complex 
social programmes (Connell and Kubisch, 1998) implicitly construct the programmes 
they investigate as simple systems. This is demonstrated by the fact that both 
identifying desired outcomes and designing an implementation and programme theory 
pathway or roadmap which will lead to the achievement of those outcomes are key 
stages in conducting a ToC evaluation (Weiss, 1995; Connell and Kubisch, 1998). The 
guidance and statements published by the UK government on the topic of youth work 
evaluation adopt and advocate the wider adoption of this methodological approach. The 
Framework for Outcomes, for example, outlines a model for youth work organisations to 
follow – a programme theory – in order to improve young people’s emotional and social 
capabilities. Conceptualising youth work as a simple system in this way suggests that, 
through good practice, young people can be impacted by interaction with youth work 
organisations and professionals in a consistent fashion and that these interactions, 
when of a consistent standard, can result in the achievement of specific positive 
outcomes. 
  
Despite the range of outcomes the Framework identifies, the system it constructs is a 
relatively simple one. It suggests the possibility for a linear, causal relationship between 
the implementation of particular practices and the achievement of outcomes to exist. 
This argument is further entrenched by the Framework which depicts a model of 
working with young people which can, through implementing particular practices, result 
in specific outcomes (the ‘seven clusters’ of emotional and social capability) (Young 
Foundation, 2012). This is a fundamental misunderstanding of youth work which 
according to authors such as Young (1999) and Sercombe (2010) is much more fluid 
and responsive - taking young people as its primary constituent (Sercombe, 2010) and 
designing approaches and activities around their needs. It therefore represents a 
complex rather than a simple system. 
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Complex systems are very different to their simple counterparts. According to 
commentators such as Callaghan (2008) and Gilchrist (2000), complex systems are 
characterised by a lack of regularity, linearity and movement towards equilibrium. They 
operate, in the words of Barnes et al (2003), ‘at the critical point on the continuum 
between rigidity and randomness characterised by a state of ‘untidy creativity’ (Barnes 
et al, 2003: 278). Unlike simple systems, such as that depicted in the Framework for 
Outcomes, there is no underlying roadmap which complex systems align themselves to. 
On the contrary, complex systems are constantly moving towards ‘the edge of chaos’ 
(Gilchrist, 2000: 267). Importantly, the identification of systems as complex by theorists 
such as Gilchrist is not intended to be a process of clarification or labelling. Gilchrist and 
others, in outlining why differentiates complex from simple systems also advocate from 
greater acceptance of complexity approaches. The ‘untidy creativity’ and ‘chaos’ which 
characterises complex systems, according to complexity advocates, enables periods of 
‘exponential’ development (Callaghan, 2008), encourages innovation and openness to 
new ways of thinking and acting (Gilchrist, 2000). 
  
While there is still a good deal of discussion on what characterises a complex system, 
some attempts to identify their chief characteristics has been made. As a general guide 
Cilliers (2005) argues that complex systems are dynamic, unbounded and non-linear. 
They are self-referential in the sense that order is negotiated as the system evolves. 
Their functioning is not reducible to their parts – there is no direct link between the 
components of the system and its operations. Finally, there are no causal pathways 
within complex systems. Any developments which emerge are erratic, unpredictable 
and cannot be explained as resulting from specific actions. Complex systems - although 
undesirable to proponents of approaches such as the Framework for Outcomes which 
campaigns for the production and achievement of regular, pre-set goals – are 
increasingly common within social programmes. This is due the fact that social 
programmes are now designed to operate at multiple levels, affecting for example 
individuals, communities, national populations and international populations (Barnes et 
al, 2004). Moreover, social programmes are intended to be adaptive to emergent issues 
and changes in conditions and to be open to avenues for programme development 
which open unexpectedly and opportunistically (Benjamin and Greene, 2009).  
  
The model of complex systems outlined above has clear resonances with youth work 
practice. Youth work, as Sercombe (2010) argues, does not follow a particular 
framework but is always in a state of emergence. Youth work organisations’ practices 
are constantly being reconstituted in collaboration with the young people they have 
contact with (Sercombe, 2010; In Defence of Youth Work, 2011). Youth work, according 
to its advocates and commentators, is an ‘iterative’ (Ord, 2014) practice which eschews 
forward-planning or fixed targets, arguing that these inspire instrumentalism (ibid) and 
reproduce the coercive relations of power between practitioners and young people that 
youth work is attempting to subvert (Sercombe, 2010). Moreover, within youth work, the 
scale of outcomes or impact is not reducible to the type of activity or approach adopted. 
The intensity of and effort needed to sustain a particular invention may not be reflected 
in the outcome of the intervention. Seemingly small practices – a game of pool, a 
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conversation – can yield benefits for the young person which far exceeds the resources 
supporting the activity (although there is of course a skill to mobilising these practices 
effectively). Given the disavowal of specific targets and opportunistic ways of working 
adopted by youth work, the application of ToC-resonant frameworks is a mistake.  
 
Governance, ‘good science’ and the UK evaluation agenda 
 
The above discussion indicates the dissonance between youth work and ToC 
evaluation, highlighting how the latter restructures youth work artificially into a simple 
format which is at some distance from its established complex form. However, this 
article is not just intended to problematise a specific method but challenge the 
evaluation agenda more generally through demonstrating that this agenda uses the 
notion of ‘good/bad science’ as a means to govern youth work rather than either 
develop further understanding of it or facilitate the emergence of better approaches.  
 
Centrally what I want to demonstrate (and criticise) is that the current evaluation agenda 
for UK youth work is overly concerned with the application of a specific method - Theory 
of Change - and ignores the pluralist nature of social inquiry. Resultantly, youth work 
evaluation does not generate concepts and data which can further our understanding of 
the nuances of youth work and limits the capacity of evaluation to assist in the 
emergence of innovative ways of working or developing new knowledges. Crucially, this 
is intentional. It is another vehicle for a neo-liberal inspired programme for youth work 
targeted at structuring and orientating the practice in a particular direction (one which 
will yield pre-set outcomes). ‘Science’ within this discourse is there to legitimise and 
reinforce policy and assist in regulation. This use of ‘science’ to regulate complex 
systems is not novel; Oakley (2000), Denzin and Giardina (2006, 2010) and Trinder and 
Reynolds (2000) all describe how campaigns to introduce more ‘scientifically rigorous’ 
research in health and social care and education are mobilised as mechanisms for 
legitimising particular policy approaches - e.g. No Child Left Behind in the United States 
- and regulate interactions between practitioners and service-users at a local level.  
 
However, this is not to say that all evaluation is regulatory or that youth work should not 
be requested to provide an account of itself. It would be a mistake to argue that we 
should simply accept youth workers’ promotion of their practice as positive without 
requesting supporting evidence from them. This is not my intention. Indeed, as I will 
note later on, evaluation can be a positive experience as it encourages organisations to 
critically reflect on their practices drawing out, as Deleuze (1991) notes, the points of 
disjuncture and tensions. Following Foucault (Foucault and Rabinow,1997) it is at these 
points that possibilities for new ways of interacting with young people can emerge and 
problematic relations between subjects (youth worker - young person, young person - 
adult and so on) can be disrupted. Furthermore, given that it is often publicly funded, 
youth work has a responsibility to demonstrate how the financial resources it draws 
upon are used. That said, as before, what I want to demonstrate is the problems with 
the current evaluation agenda.  
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To initiate this discussion I want to consider three points: (i) why the promotion of one 
method over others has been (and should be) opposed; (ii) how such methodological 
fundamentalism ignores potentially beneficial pluralist forms of evidence and inquiry, 
and (ii) how it restricts the critical possibilities presented by evaluation research and 
serves to regulate organisations. To assist in this latter point I will draw from broader 
writing on ‘new empiricism’ which explore research of ‘sense-data’ or experience more 
generally, positioning evaluation research as part of this.  
 
Accusations and discussions of ‘methodological fundamentalism’ have been most 
prevalent in writing on the application of Randomized Control Trials (RCTs) in social 
programme evaluation (particularly educational programmes). Drawn from the natural 
sciences RCTs’ objective is to demonstrate and identify the outcomes and impacts of 
particular programmes - and their socially curative potential - through the application of 
treatments in structured experiments (Torrance, 2010; Donaldson et al, 2009; Oakley, 
2000). As a number of authors from the US and UK have argued, from the early 2000s 
on, RCTs have been increasingly positioned as the method de rigeur in evaluation 
research. While their promotion has been more explicit in the US (Shaker and 
Ruitenberg, 2007), analyses of guidance on how to ensure evaluation research quality 
in evaluation research point to similar trends in the UK (Torrance, 2010) albeit through 
the language of ‘pilot programmes’ (Cabinet Office, 2003) and command that 
‘findings/conclusions [need to be] supported by evidence’ (Cabinet Office, 2003: 22). 
 
The complaint of critics of RCTs is not that they are an inherently ‘bad’ social science 
research method or incompatible with social programme evaluation. Indeed Howe 
(2009) explicitly warns against an opposition of RCTs on these grounds as risking the 
construction of an equally problematic dogma of ‘scientific’ versus humanities-inspired 
approaches. Rather the central criticism is that the ‘heavy promotion’ of a particular 
methodology over all others: 
  
... [reverses] the logical and time-honoured order of decisions when conducting 
social inquiry. First, one identifies the inquiry purposes and questions, and only 
then selects a methodology that fits these purposes and questions (Greene, 
2009: 157; see also Chelimsky, 2007) 
 
By emphasising a specific methodology, policy-makers marginalise questions of 
relevancy or desirability - whether the method is the most useful tool for assessing the 
value of particular approaches or whether the information gathered will be what policy-
makers want (Torrance, 2010). As Shaker and Ruitenberg (2007) write: 
 
It is quite possible to design random experiments [...] in the field of education - 
but nothing in that test design itself guarantees the desirability or relevance of the 
research questions or outcomes (Shaker and Ruitenberg, 2007: 211) 
 
Fundamentally, opposition to RCTs is rooted in a professional ethic which resists the 
subservience of research to policy, i.e. that research should deliver what policy-makers 
want, arguing that the maintaining quality in social science research ‘cannot be 
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ensconced in a single research method’ (Torrance, 2010: 73). The pre-eminence of 
RCTs as a ‘gold standards’, authors such as Denzin and Giardina (2006) argue, 
presents ‘scienticism’ as science. 
 
Importantly the promotion of RCTs - or indeed any single outcome-oriented method - is 
not just problematic in terms of preserving the norms of the social science research 
process, it also has a profound impact on the subjects of research, serving to discipline 
them to masculinist logics of ‘hard’ ‘reliability’ (in terms of their regularity in producing 
particular outcomes) as opposed to ‘softer’, more feminine, ‘unreliability’ (Oakley, 2000). 
The foci of evaluations are turned into objects which can be controlled and manipulated 
in order to yield outcomes which can be measured and compared. As Oakley’s (2000) 
feminist critique of gender and method in social science research argue ‘experiments 
are inherently ‘objectifying’ and alienating’ (Oakley, 2000: 38) and lead to ‘all bodies, 
whether human or animal, being seen as machines’ (ibid: 39).  
 
Connected with this methodological fundamentalism, the government’s evaluation 
agenda for youth work is problematic due to the lack of recognition it gives to the 
pluralist nature of social scientific inquiry and indeed the ‘disunity’ of science (Kuhn, 
1953). There are any number of methodological approaches which can be used to 
gather evidence of a social phenomenon. Despite the so-called ‘paradigm wars’ (Taylor 
and Balloch, 2005: 1) between advocates of different approaches, there is a general 
consensus across contemporary philosophies of science and social inquiry that there is 
no ‘master epistemology’ (St. Pierre, 2002) which can be universally applied. The 
general acceptance that the idea of a perfect source of evidence is illogical is reflected 
not least in the promotion of ‘critical thinking’ amongst the scientific community and 
need for researchers to be explicit about the faults in their own research designs and 
approaches. 
  
On one level the UK government appears to recognise the pluralist nature of social 
science. Both the HCEC report and the Framework for Positive Outcomes criticise the 
supposed over-reliance on quantitative measures of participation – ‘headcounts’ in 
particular – in evaluation of youth work and advocate the inclusion of more diverse 
forms of evidence. At the same time, this seeming commitment to pluralism is 
accompanied by the labelling of evidence submitted to the HCEC review as ‘non-
scientific’ or ‘anecdotal’ (HCEC, 2011) and the promotion of a very specific metric for 
measuring youth work organisations’ impact through the Framework. Ironically, in 
rejecting oral and written submissions by young people and youth workers which 
illustrate the transformative effect of youth work through case studies and storytelling as 
insufficiently ‘scientifically rigorous’, the government evaluation agenda promotes the 
notion of a ‘master epistemology’ a belief which, according to contemporary writing on 
pluralist social inquiry, is indicative of scientific reductionism (Greene, 2009; St. Pierre, 
2002). 
  
The exclusion of submissions to the HCEC from the umbrella of scientifically rigorous 
evidence is underpinned by an implicit prioritisation of particular ways of knowing and 
forms of knowledge over others without much justification as to why. Such prioritisation 
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appears all the more confusing given that, in the Framework for Outcomes and 
description of the CYI, the government promotes gathering evidence from stakeholders. 
However, there are two potential explanations for the rejection of stakeholder evidence 
by the HCEC. The delineation between evidence from stakeholders submitted 
voluntarily to the HCEC as ‘unscientific’ and evidence gathered through the Framework 
for Outcomes matrix as ‘scientific’ reflects a specific understanding of the dynamics of 
knowledge production whereby knowledge is not constructed by participants but 
gathered from them. Such an understanding follows a discourse of credible knowledge 
and scientific inquiry which prioritises the figure of the external, value-neutral ‘expert’ as 
the only legitimate collator of information (Donaldson et al, 2009). This is much 
discussed and criticised by thinkers such as Oakley (2000) who argues that it reflects 
deeply entrenched social biases and unequal power relations between communities 
who experience a particular phenomenon and supposedly more learned scientists.  
 
The treatment of knowledge gathered as of greater scientific value than knowledge 
volunteered can also be found elsewhere in UK policy. The Green Book: Appraisal and 
Evaluation in Central Government (HM Treasury, 2011), for example, states that 
participatory research methods where knowledge is co-constructed with participants 
rather than gathered from them through researcher designed matrices are not legitimate 
approaches in evaluation research. This is despite the extensive literature highlighting 
not just the methodological appropriateness but scientific legitimacy of participatory 
research methods (Weis and Fine, 2004; Greene et al, 2004; Whyte, 1991) for 
developing better understandings of the dynamics of social programmes. Moreover, 
advocates of participatory methods have consistently argued that these methodologies 
are more ‘actionable’ and more useful for facilitating social programme development 
and change than traditional researcher-directed data collection approaches. By 
depicting the HCEC submissions as ‘unscientific’ the UK government are, at best, 
inaccurately representing accepted norms of good practice in social scientific research 
which do not discount evidence on the basis of whether it was gathered or volunteered. 
  
Another, interconnected, explanation for the disavowal of submissions to the HCEC as 
‘anecdotal’ rather than ‘scientific’ relates to the politics of evaluation (Taylor and Balloch, 
2005; Greene, 2009). This explanation has less to do with how knowledge is 
understood and more to do with the politicisation of research. According to Greene 
(2009), within contemporary policy debates, evidence is labelled as not meeting the 
standards of ‘scientific rigour’ when it does not facilitate the advancement of particular 
political projects, not when it is representative of ‘bad science’. In the context of youth 
work and evaluation, this argument has already been outlined in some depth by In 
Defence of Youth Work (2011), Ord (2014) and others. These commentators argue that 
the HCEC rejected submissions indicating the ‘transformative’ effect youth work 
participation has as they did not sit well with contemporary neoliberal-inspired 
discourses of public and social policy management which insist on organisations and 
services becoming oriented towards the achievement of targets (In Defence of Youth 
Work, 2011). From this perspective the standards of ‘scientific quality’ applied by the UK 
government were directed not by contemporary philosophy of science and social inquiry 
but by political ideology.  
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The third issue which I wish to consider in this critique of the blanket promotion of ToC 
is the critical possibilities empirical research presents and how the current agenda 
undermines these. Here I will draw on debates regarding ‘new empiricism’. Rooted in 
the writing of Gilles Deleuze - particularly his commentary on the work of David Hume 
(Deleuze, 1991) - this emerging area of discussion considers (amongst other things) the 
role of theory in empirical research. According to Deleuze, a key function of empirical 
inquiry is to connect disparate, partly-unknowable bodies which exist in abstraction with 
the concrete world and in doing so highlight the disjunctures between the body in 
abstraction and the ‘actualised’ body. Importantly, new empiricism and Deleuzean 
theory does not limit the term ‘body’ to ‘a particular discrete entity [...] but to any form, 
including both material bodies and bodies of knowledge or ideas’ (Bignall, 2007: 202) 
and as such can be applied to studies of organisations or practices such as youth work.  
 
Taken into the context of evaluating youth work, a new empiricist perspective positions 
research not as a way of producing a verifiable generalised theory of how youth work 
organisations operate but a mechanism for generating new forms youth work can take 
or new practices it can engage in. The purpose of evaluation - even in its summative 
form - is not to surmise what youth work is but provide a means of articulating youth 
work as a complex array of meanings and positionalities. As Bignall (2007) explains, 
new empiricism argues that through empirical reflection: 
 
the sites in one’s own self where one’s identity is multiple and perhaps 
contradictory [...]. These apparent points of disjunction in one’s own identity [...] 
signal point where the constituting discourses are unstable. It is in seeking out 
and finding such points of instability, Deleuze and Guattari suggest, that a person 
becomes most advantageously placed to experiment with the assemblage they 
embody and with the [abstract body] they might access in order to become 
identified otherwise (Bignall, 2007: 210) 
 
Concepts assist in this process by acting as ‘thought experiments’ (Adkins and Lury, 
2009: 12) which help think through the conditions necessary for abstract bodies to come 
into existence and recognise the points of ‘undecideability’ (Bignall, 2007: 210) within 
them. The should not be complete representations of how organisations work or direct 
what organisations should do but facilitate critical thinking about the zones of 
undecideability within an organisation where new practices or new ways of being could 
be explored and experimented with.  
 
However, the promotion of ToC undermines this extension and experimentation. Under 
this method reflection is not used as a mechanism for generating mutation or critical 
openness (Foucault and Rabinow, 1997) but as a corrective (Deleuze, 1991) - the aim 
is not to open spaces for experimentation but to ensure adherence to pre-set 
understandings. The manipulation of ‘scientism’ in order to restrict the capacity of 
organisations to experiment and introduce new ways of working is exemplary of how 
organisations are ‘rendered governable’ in contemporary society (Carmel and Harlock, 
2008). By consistently positioning ToC/outcomes-oriented evaluation as of a higher 
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standard than participatory approaches (through labelling the results of the latter 
‘anecdotal’ and ‘non-systematic’), government agencies have constructed a discourse 
of evaluation research where openings for stakeholders in youth work to express their 
experiences or challenge the targets set by government are closed down. 
 
In adopting the language of ‘science’, the political nature of the UK evaluation agenda – 
highlighted in great depth by youth work commentators (Issitt and Spence, 2005; Ord, 
2014) – is both being played down by government agencies and accepted by local 
authorities. That said, as the In Defence of Youth Work campaign indicates, the 
evaluation agenda is being rejected and questioned by some youth work organisations. 
However the list of signatories to Framework for Outcomes demonstrates that the model 
of ‘science’ peddled by government is also finding a good deal of support among 
national youth work agencies.  
  
A way forward? 
 
In light of the preceding arguments - particularly the implication that the methodological 
fundamentalism demonstrated by youth work evaluation policy is a strategy of 
regulation - it would be easy to resist any form of evaluation. However, such a knee-jerk 
reaction is equally problematic as the policing through campaigns for scientific rigour in 
that it ignores the very real pressure on governments to demonstrate that publicly 
financed programmes are productive (Torrance, 2010). It also ignores the potential of 
evaluation to assist campaigns for social justice and democratic dialogue (DiStefano, 
2000). Youth work scholars have already recognised the potential for research practice 
to encourage young people’s critical learning and political participation (Coburn, 2011; 
Gormally and Coburn, 2014) and for evaluation specifically to strengthen the socially 
transformative possibilities youth and community organisations present (Cooper, 2012). 
If the problem then is the form of evaluation being projected as ‘good science’ not the 
aim of evaluating youth work per se then it is crucial to explore alternative research 
practices which do not artificially structure youth work into a simple system or act as a 
‘corrective’. This is a daunting task and one which requires a much longer conversation. 
But in reaction to the arguments introduced above I wish to make two suggestions for 
how to circumvent the disciplinary effects of the current discourse of scientifically 
rigorous evaluation espoused in the UK’s agenda for improving youth work. 
 
Based on the critiques of methodological fundamentalism and ‘gold standards’ (as 
silencing and exclusionary) presented by Oakley (2000) and others, the starting point 
for a discussion on how to integrate evaluation with youth work without restricting the 
latter should be to unsettle evidence as the main concern. RCTs and ToC are 
manifestations of a discourse of science obsessed with the application of methods in 
order to yield particular forms of evidence. Indeed the HCEC’s report and the CYI are 
both dedicated to the production of evidence. This is decidedly wrong-headed given the 
relativistic and malleable nature of data (a discussion covered in some depth by 
MacLure (2009) in her analysis of ‘the ruins’ of evidence), the dependence of evidence 
on interpretation and the inherent incompleteness of evidence (Deleuze, 1991). 
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As an alternative to this, a key focus should be developing an understanding of the 
different elements of youth work – an exercise of shining a light on or ‘stripping back 
non-cognition and sliding towards cognition’ (Gregg and Seigworth, 2013: 14) – while at 
the same time accepting that not everything will be ‘knowable’. The aim is not to gather 
particular forms of evidence but to come close to knowing as much about youth work as 
possible. This will not just involve broadening acceptance of qualitative research such 
as storytelling (an approach used by the In Defence of Youth Work campaign) but also 
lead to the forms of quantitative data-gathering which the HCEC dismisses as ‘counting’ 
being valued for the demographic information they provide. As Oakley (2000) notes, 
numerical evidence is not in itself problematic so long as it is not promoted over other 
forms of evidence in an artificial dualism of ‘good’/’bad’ science.  
 
The second tentative step towards a less disciplinary evaluation agenda would be to 
unsettle measuring economic ‘effectiveness’ in favour of fiscal transparency. These are 
conflated within the UK government’s evaluation guidance as part of the ‘three e’s’ – 
economic, effective, efficient – but as a focal point for evaluation research have very 
different impacts on the subject of evaluations. Fiscal transparency is in essence an 
exercise in description (what was money spent on, by whom, to what end) whereas 
economic effectiveness measurement is an exercise in monitoring returns for 
investments. Given its complex nature and the range of variables impacting upon its 
outcomes (i.e. the neighbourhood it operates in, the type of young people involved) 
youth work’s ability to clearly demonstrate economic effectiveness according to a cost-
benefit analysis is limited. However economic effectiveness is not the only indicator that 
public expenditure is managed well. Transparency in what spending takes place can 
also give a clear indication of the work done in and by youth work organisations and 
allow policy-makers to meet the basis expectation that the public will be able to know 
the destination of their investments. 
 
The fundamental difference between economic effectiveness and fiscal transparency 
relates to determinism. An evaluation dedicated to measuring economic effectiveness is 
focussed at determining whether spending was warranted or well-managed; an 
evaluation focussed at fiscal transparency is more interested in uncovering and 
describing what went on rather than assessing whether money could have been better 
spent directly (although this may well be one of the ways such an evaluation is 
subsequently used). Less disciplinary evaluations, according to theorists such as Mark 
et al (2000) should eschew determination: 
 
Determination implies a role for evaluation that cannot be justified. It suggests 
coming to a fixed answer or settling a question. The very origins of the word 
suggest coming to an end. In evaluation, these connotations are unfortunate and 
undesirable. For one thing the limits of evaluation argue against using a term that 
implies finality (Mark et al, 2000: 55) 
 
This connects back to the arguments made above, that the ToC model being imposed 
on youth work is problematic as it promotes a focus on ends – or finality – rather than 
innovation or progression. 
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Conclusion 
 
As this article demonstrates the model of ‘good science’ proposed under the UK 
government’s evaluation agenda for youth work is highly problematic. It artificially 
constructs an image of youth work as a simple system, overlooking its complexity. As a 
result, rather than allow organisations to articulate and shine a light on the complex 
dynamics of their work, as others have noted, it forces youth workers to focus on 
achieving pre-set goals. This runs counter to youth work’s professional ideology of 
responsiveness and non-coercive relationships (Sercombe, 2010). Moreover, in addition 
to this managerialism, the evaluation agenda is overly reliant on a specific method – 
ToC – and limits the potential for evaluation to facilitate innovation and critical thinking. 
It is a methodological fundamentalist ‘corrective’ approach. To illustrate the problems 
with single-method reliance the article has looked to critiques of Randomised Control 
Trials as a ‘gold standard’ in educational research, drawing on the work of Oakley 
(2000), Torrance (2008, 2010) and others, arguing that this is a form of ‘scientism’ 
where the application of particular methods takes precedence over the subject of 
research on the grounds that ‘science is science is science’ (Lather, 2004). 
 
However, the article has also recognised that, as youth work is publically funded, there 
is a political imperative for policy-makers to evaluate the practice. For that reason it has 
not discounted evaluation but proposed two ways that the current problematic discourse 
of ‘good science’ could be disrupted: displacing evidence as the main concern and 
replacing economic effectiveness with fiscal transparency as an objective of evaluation 
research. These tentative suggestions are intended to flow into a larger, on-going 
conversation about how to find a ‘nexus’ (Gormally and Coburn, 2014) between 
research practice and youth which may lead to transformation (Cooper, 2012).  
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